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Most provincial emergency management legislation (Quebec excepted) fails to include regulatory
guidelines as to how local authorities reduce community vulnerability. This exposes individual(s) and
groups to greater vulnerability to disasters if the local authority decides not to act or provide inadequate
management. In addition, access to ﬁnancial resources to assist or compensate local governments and/or
private landowners for damages endured often come with attachments or do not exist. When damages
result from a government's action or inaction in the event of an emergency, provisions in provincial
legislation and court ﬁndings have reduced government exposure to civil liability at common law further
exposing private landowners to ﬁnancial risk.
This paper argues that a lack of standards in emergency management legislation, restrictive access to
ﬁnancial assistance and/or compensation and reduced government exposure to civil liability at common
law expose private landowners to greater vulnerability to disasters and the liability attached. It is es-
sential that those responsible for proactive/preventative planning for disasters work from a standard
playbook, one which sets minimum safeguards for the public. Absent of clear and fulsome compensation
guidelines, private landowners will bear an unfair and disproportionate ﬁnancial risk.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In 1970, the Manitoba government completed the Portage Di-
versionwater control work that diverts water from the Assiniboine
River during periods of high ﬂow. Its purpose is to deter ﬂooding
of valuable farmland and to protect residents of Winnipeg, acting
as an emergency mitigation strategy. It is one of several works that
the government has completed to control the ﬂow of water within
the province. In the spring of 2011, lands along Lake Manitoba and
in the Interlake Region experienced signiﬁcant ﬂooding. Lawsuits
commenced arguing that the diversion of water by the Province
through the Portage Diversion and the operation of the Shell-
mouth and Fairford Dams caused increased exposure to ﬂooding in
parts of lower Manitoba and that the damages suffered by land
owners and First Nations are, in large measure, a result of the
Province's actions (see [1]).
In Anderson et al. v. Manitoba et al. [1], the plaintiffs argue that
the Province should be found liable for damages on, inter alia, the
basis of operational negligence and nuisance. The Government of
Manitoba, however, argues that it has “statutory responsibilities to
operate water control works as necessary or expedient in theLtd. This is an open access article u
ean@uwo.ca (G. McBean).public interest, and policy decisions which balance the interests of
all Manitobans are immune from civil liability” (MBQB 255, para.
29–31). In this case, jurisdiction, responsibility and exposure to
civil liability at common law are major considerations in de-
termining what liability, if any, a government has in emergency
management policy and practice. The intersection of water re-
sources management by provincial authorities and emergency
management planning and implementation are directly implicated
in the determination of liability.
Despite some progress in transitioning emergency manage-
ment systems to include disaster risk reduction, emergency
management agencies remain reluctant to adopt proactive man-
agement for natural hazards. This is due, in part, to the difference
in stakeholders’ interests, jurisdictional conﬂict between levels of
government, and citizens as ‘aggressive consumers’ of policy [34].
In fact, governments have rejected adopting risk reduction stra-
tegies due to liability concerns, competing priorities, and disrup-
tion of cultural values [3,34,4]. This inaction is a reﬂection of the
institutions that govern day-to-day activity as well as the gov-
erning bodies who dictate responsibilities and priorities.
Research by the United Nations Ofﬁce for Disaster Risk Re-
duction (UNISDR) [42] argues that poor emergency management
governance is a main reason for the increase of natural disasters
that are otherwise preventable. The main argument advanced is
that those responsible for emergency management to naturalnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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policy and practices [25]. This absence is partly rooted in a culture
of blame and blame avoidance. As Charbonneau and Bellavance [5]
argue, blame avoidance results from limited transparency, in-
centives and a lack of consequences attached to performance. This
is conﬁrmed by Moynihan's [29] examination of networks in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Moynihan notes that political re-
sponsibility is centered in a culture where intra-network and ex-
tra-network reputations create “incentives to utilize blame
avoidance strategies when failure occurs” (567). The lack of ac-
countability within these networks of public policy from blame
avoidance strategies has directly impacted the approach taken to
emergency management to natural disasters (see [2,29]).
One approach to resolving this issue is through laws and reg-
ulations; however, even then many activists and experts claim that
these laws addressing disaster risk reduction have failed to make
“the difference they promised” ([25], ix). The adequacy or in-
adequacy of existing legislative efforts raises an important issue of
the relationship between responsibility and liability in emergency
management in the context of emergency disaster risk reduction.
Emergency management legislation serves two functions: ﬁrst,
it outlines the powers and authority in a Province to plan for and
respond to an emergency; and, secondly, it sets limits on civil
liability to protect governments for their actions. As it stands,
governments already have reduced exposure to civil liability at
common law when compared to an individual or private entity.
The underlying issue in each case remains at what point is gov-
ernment action or inaction so unreasonable such that individual
(s) or group(s) should not be expected to bear that risk and loss?
For example, if a Province, being in control of most waterways
within their provincial boundaries, decides to divert water to
protect one community but in doing so, puts an individual at
greater risk of ﬂooding, is it reasonable for that individual to bear
all or even some of the damages that occur without full com-
pensation? At what point should governments be liable for the
damages that result from their action or inaction in an emergency
situation?
The lack of any emergency planning standard in emergency
management legislation and the obscurity of ﬁnancial assistance
and compensation for those impacted by the emergency raise
important issues in the law of emergency management. We argue
that the absence of accountability and use of blame avoidance are
deeply rooted within legislation and ﬁnancial programs/arrange-
ments which, as a result, gives rise to greater exposure to liability
for damages. We propose that there is a need for explicit standards
in emergency management policy and practice. Critical to that
issue is whether, from a public policy perspective, the risk of in-
adequate emergency management planning or the absence of such
planning should be borne by private interests when there are no
measurable standards to which governments must adhere and the
courts have recognized a zone of protection from civil liability for
all levels of government.2. Legislative standards
Jurisdiction over emergency management law results from a
gap in the Constitution Act [40] which divides legislative authority
of the Provinces and federal government over matters in Canada.
Both federal and provincial levels of governments are at liberty to
deﬁne their respective roles in these matters because neither level
of government is vested with clear authority for emergencies.
While the Emergency Management Act (Canada) (SC 2007, c 15)
[10] recognizes responsibility for emergency management as a
provincial area of responsibility, each province in turn has the
authority to delegate that responsibility to municipalities throughlegislation. As a result, the federal government has very little in-
volvement in emergency management planning and im-
plementation and the Provinces have jurisdiction to make laws
that impose obligations on local governments to do things or not
do things. Emergency management in Canada has, in large mea-
sure, been devolved to municipal governments. This is not to say
that the Provinces have no responsibility in emergency manage-
ment as they have responsibility for land and water within their
provincial boundaries. As shown above, they have been involved in
controlling the ﬂow of water throughout their provinces which
has been utilized as a tool in emergency management—the pre-
paration for impeding emergencies caused by natural forces.
Unlike the Province or federal government, municipal govern-
ments do not have the luxury of determining their roles. They
derive their power and existence through legislation, such as a
Local Government Act (RSBC 1996, c 323, as amended) [28] or
Municipal Act (SO 2001, c 25, as amended) [31]. They are creatures
of statute. Municipal governments, like private entities and citi-
zens, are bound by provincial statutes, including those that impose
obligations and standards for emergency preparedness and re-
sponse. They make emergency planning and implementation de-
cisions in both a common law and statutory context.
Most emergency management legislation provide no standards
for emergency management practice. For example, Section 6(2) of
the Emergency Program Act (RSBC 1996, c 111, as amended) [15] in
British Columbia states, “a local authority must prepare or cause to
be prepared local emergency plans respecting preparation for,
response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters.” What
this piece of legislation and other legislation pertaining to emer-
gency management fails to include is a deﬁned standard which
municipalities must meet for the preparation, response and re-
covery plans. This undeﬁned obligation leaves the door open for
municipalities to interpret the law as they see ﬁt. ‘Preparation for’
an emergency can be understood as simple as having an evacua-
tion plan adopted and ready if an emergency requires such action.
‘Preparation for’ does not impose particular steps of preparedness,
i.e. certain action takes place throughout the province as dictated
through legislation, such as updating ﬂood plain maps. For ex-
ample, Section 11 of Alberta's Emergency Management Act (RSA
2000, c E-6.8, as amended) [9] states,
A local authority (a) shall, at all times, be responsible for the
direction and control of the local authority's emergency re-
sponse unless the Government assumes direction and control
under Section 18; (b) shall prepare and approve emergency
plans and programs.
Nothing in these provisions speciﬁes what these plans and
programs should consist of.
In some cases, provincial statutes fail to impose obligations on
local governments to even have emergency management/measure
plans by making it optional. Section 7(b) of Prince Edward Island's
Emergency Measures Act (RSPEI 1988, c E-6.1, as amended) [13]
states,
The Minister may request municipalities to prepare emergency
measures plans including mutual assistance programs, and to
submit them to the Emergency Measures Organization for re-
view for adequacy and integration with the provincial emer-
gency plan.
Section 8 of the same legislation states, “Each municipality
(a) may establish and maintain a municipal emergency measures
organization by passage of a by-law; […] (d) pursuant to clause 7
(b), may prepare and approve emergency measures plans.” There
is no obligation on a municipality to have an emergency measures
plan according to this legislation unless the Minister directs it to
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gency be approaching, the province and municipal government
may have no obligation to do anything, placing the responsibility
to prepare, respond to and recover from an emergency on the
public. This can be problematic because individual(s) and group
(s) may not necessarily know or recognize the extent of their
vulnerability to an impending emergency until it occurs. Without
notice and awareness of the likely direct impacts of an emergency,
the public's actions in the face of an emergency may be minimal
and disjointed. There may be an understandable lack of appre-
ciation of the risks of impending emergencies and what this
means to these individuals and groups. Legislation that permits
governments to choose whether or not to adopt an emergency
measures plan may have beneﬁts for government by reducing
their costs and potential civil liability as will be seen below, but at
the cost of exposing greater risk to the public and private property.
There are some Provinces and Territories in Canada that have
mandated emergency management standards for municipal gov-
ernments to abide by. Section 2.1 of Ontario's Emergency Man-
agement and Civil Protection Act (RSO 1990, c E.9, as amended) [12]
requires municipal governments to adopt an emergency man-
agement program consisting of an emergency management plan,
training programs and exercises for municipal employees and all
personnel necessary in responding to and recovery from an
emergency, public education on the risks to public safety and how
to prepare for an emergency, and any other standards for emer-
gency management programs set by the Solicitor General. These
programs have to “identify and assess the various hazards and
risks to public safety that could give rise to emergencies and
identify the facilities and other elements of the infrastructure that
are at risk of being affected by emergencies” (S. 2.1.3). In Nunavut,
every municipal council is required to go beyond identifying and
assessing the various hazards and risk to public safety in their own
community. Municipal councils must also identify the risks to
neighboring communities that may result from an emergency and
do the following:
In accordance with the policies, criteria and other measures
established by the Minister: (i) prepare an emergency man-
agement program in respect of those risks; (ii) maintain, test
and implement that program; and (iii) conduct exercises in
relation to the program. (Emergency Measures Act, SNu 2007,
c.10, as amended, S. 6.1(b)) [14].
Where this differs from Ontario's emergency management
legislation is the requirement for testing of the emergency man-
agement program that is adopted by the municipality. By testing
the program, the goal is to maximize efﬁciency to respond to an
emergency. Roles and responsibilities are clearly established and
understood so as to limit any confusion that could give rise to
greater harm when swift and proper action are not taken.
Quebec's [6] (CQLR 2010, c S-2.3, as amended) is different than
most other emergency management legislation throughout Cana-
da in that not all municipalities are solely responsible for devel-
oping and implementing emergency management plans. Accord-
ing to this Act, regional authorities are to work with municipal
governments to establish a civil protection plan which sets out
objectives to reduce “major disaster vulnerability for their entire
territory and the actions required to achieve those objectives” (S.
16). Municipalities, like Montréal, Québec City, Gatineau, Laval,
Lévis, Longueuil and Mirabel, have been designated as regional
authorities and, therefore, they must establish their own civil
protection plans. Where Quebec's provincial legislation differs
from most other emergency management legislation is a clear
outline of what must be included in each civil protection plan,
including: a summary of the area's physical, natural, human, socialand economic characteristics; identify and assess the degree of
vulnerability of major disaster risks; specify the source and con-
sequences of a major disaster pertaining to those risks; identify
the areas that could be affected; what existing safety measures are
in place; the resources at the disposal of the regional authority;
determine achievable safety objectives; specify actions and criteria
for their implementation to achieve those objectives; and proce-
dures to assess the actions taken pursuant to the civil protection
plan and the degree to which those objectives have been com-
pleted (S. 16). Quebec's [6] (CQLR 2010, c S-2.3, as amended) is the
most explicit in standardizing emergency management policy in a
provincial statute in Canada. The Act speciﬁes what is required in
all emergency management plans and it requires biophysical and
socio-economic assessments in order to properly identify and as-
sess the exposure to disasters and individual vulnerability so that
steps may be taken to reduce that vulnerability.
In general, there is a lack of speciﬁc standards across all pro-
vincial and territory legislation in Canada. Nine of ten Provinces
and all three Territories in Canada require local authorities/mu-
nicipal governments to develop or adopt an emergency program
and plan, the contents of which are different from statute to sta-
tute. Most emergency management legislation requires that the
plans adopted consist of procedures and proper training in re-
sponse to a disaster. Beyond Quebec's commitment to reduce
vulnerability to disasters, most other Provinces and Territories do
not have explicit direction in their legislation as to what is to be
considered and assessed in order to reduce risk or exposure to an
emergency. For example, as indicated above, ‘preparation for’ does
not necessarily mean disaster risk reduction strategies.
The lack of standardized assessment of and approach to
emergency management exposes the public to greater risk in the
event of an emergency; this is especially so where provincial
legislation delegates responsibility to the local government in the
absence of any mandatory speciﬁcs of what must be done. The
very broad, general language of most legislative provisions in
many ways undermines the stated objectives of the legislation.
The result is an ad hoc, patchwork approach within the Provinces
which has the potential to impair a coordinated response to an
emergency and preventative steps. One may fairly ask whether the
purpose of these legislative provisions is to promote proactive or
reactive management to potential threats. If it is reactive man-
agement, the burden falls on individual members of the public to
be prepared which is far from an ideal result.3. Financial assistance and compensation opportunities
Where emergency management plans are required by muni-
cipal governments, current provincial programs that offer ﬁnancial
assistance or compensation opportunities often have many re-
strictions attached. For example, Section 30 of the [7] (BC Reg 124/
95, 2009) of the Emergency Program Act (RSBC 1996, c 111, as
amended) in British Columbia states that no assistance will be
provided for structural repair, rebuilding or replacement if such
structures are built in a designated ﬂood plain unless such build-
ings were determined by the Minister or Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation to be properly protected. This provision in-
directly deters ﬂood plain mapping by incentivizing local gov-
ernments to avoid updating ﬂood plain maps in order to be eli-
gible for assistance while continuing development in areas that
might be at risk.
In Raikes [36], a participant noted that the Columbian Basin
Trust had the resources to conduct a hydrological assessment for
20 municipalities in Kootenay but such assessments were not
undertaken because of the liability that would be attached to da-
mages in future development. The inability to get compensation
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nicipal action. By not updating ﬂood plain mapping, if a ﬂood did
occur, the municipality had the ability to access ﬁnancial assis-
tance and/or compensation programs. It was determined that not
knowing which areas are most vulnerable to ﬂooding was better
for these cities because they could remain eligible for ﬁnancial
assistance and compensation all while continuing to develop in
areas that may be vulnerable to such hydrological conditions.
Section 30 of British Columbia's [7] (BC Reg 124/95, 2009) ﬁnan-
cially protects the municipality at the expense of their emergency
management system.
In British Columbia, if conditions for ﬁnancial assistance and
compensation are met, the Minister still has an overriding dis-
cretion to decline claims if he/she determines that insufﬁcient
measures were taken before, during or after the disaster ([7], BC
Reg 124/95, 2009, S. 31). In fact, the majority of provincial and
territory emergency management legislation in Canada say that
compensation for damage is discretionary. As a consequence, in-
dividual property owners must rely on adequate emergency pre-
paredness by public entities but bear the ﬁnancial risks if those
efforts prove inadequate, defective or non-existent. This raises an
important question as to whether or not it is appropriate for in-
dividuals and private entities to bear the risk of inadequate or non-
existent emergency management planning given that the restric-
tions and conditions deterring emergency management practices
are embedded in emergency management legislation that fails to
outline a minimum standard of practice.
The term ‘Act of God’, which refers to natural events that
cannot be prevented from occurring and results in damage, is not
used by insurance companies in Canada. Typically, these types of
natural events are described as perils and exclusions [39]. Under
most policies, damage caused by ﬁre, wind and hail is covered, but
as it stands currently, Alberta is the only province in Canada where
insurance for ﬂooding caused by riverine, lake or creek overﬂow is
covered [39]. Most insurance companies do not offer protection
plans for high risk, large-scale events because of the potential
massive indeterminate costs associated with such events. This
includes ﬂoods caused by hurricane or sea-level rise.
The lack of available insurance to protect against property loss
from ﬂooding puts private land owners at the mercy of severe
weather events which are likely to be both more frequent and
more severe as the effects of climate change are realised. That risk
is compounded where public authorities responsible for emer-
gency planning and response are not required to, and do not have
appropriate plans and resources to forecast and prepare for major
events. Similarly, private land owners may well ﬁnd themselves
the unwitting and unwilling victims of decisions made by public
authorities such as when water is diverted to protect one group to
the peril of another. The availability and adequacy of government
compensation and/or private law remedies is crucial in these
circumstances.1 The use of person can be deﬁned as both a public entity and individual under
both of British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador’s Interpretation Act
(RSBC 1996, c 238, as amended; RSNL 1990, c I-19, as amended) [26,27]. Therefore,
both the public entity and its representatives may have reduced exposure in
compliance with this provision.4. Reduced government exposure
Although provincial and/or local governments have responsi-
bility for emergency management, that does not equate to liability
for damages that result from an emergency/disaster even when
such damages occur as a result of their decisions. In discussing
liability issues in environmental law, Muldoon et al. [30] highlight
ﬁve major concerns including: the kinds of environmental damage
that may result in liability; who should be responsible; estab-
lishing causal links between action or inaction and the resulting
damage; identifying a reasonable threshold for damages that re-
sult in liability; and, the standard of care required by the re-
sponsible party in preventing damages. The above liability issuesin environmental law arise equally in the context of emergency
management to natural disasters. Courts in Canada have long re-
cognized that governments enjoy special treatment when it comes
to civil liability in tort. Governments operate for the greater good
and, therefore, have to make difﬁcult decisions at times. They have
to make decisions in the interests of the community and not ne-
cessarily the individual. It is by this reasoning that courts have
justiﬁed reduced exposure to civil liability, less than that of a
private entity or individual (see [24,23,35].
In addition to the special treatment at common law, several
Acts dealing with emergency management contain provisions that
limit liability or exempt it altogether. In British Columbia, civil
liability exposure is reduced to actions taken in bad faith or that
are grossly negligent (Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996, c 111, as
amended, S.18) [15]. This is consistent with Section 21(a) and (b) of
Newfoundland and Labrador's Emergency Services Act (SNL 2008, c
E-9.1, as amended) [16],
A person, including the minister, the CEO, the director, an
employee, a volunteer and a person appointed under the au-
thority of this Act is not liable for a loss, cost, expense, damage
or injury to person or property which results from (a) the
person, in good faith, doing or omitting to do an act that the
person is appointed, authorized or required to do under this
Act or the regulations, unless in doing or omitting to do the act,
the person was grossly negligent; or (b) an act done or omitted
to be done by one or more persons who were, under this Act or
the regulations, appointed, authorized or required by the per-
son to do an act, unless the appointment or authorizing was not
done in good faith.1
In Nunavut, exposure remains only for actions taken in bad
faith (Section 30, Emergency Measures Act, SNu 2007, c. 10) [14]. In
Nova Scotia, Section 21 of the Emergency Management Act (SNS
1990, c 8, as amended) [11] states,
The Minister, a mayor or warden, a municipality, the Depart-
ment, a committee established pursuant to this Act or a
member thereof, or any other person (a) is not liable for any
damage arising out of any action taken pursuant to this Act or
the regulations; and (b) is not subject to any proceedings by
prohibition, certiorari, mandamus or injunction with respect to
any action taken pursuant to this Act or the regulations.
By this statute, exposure to liability for government action is
reduced to an absolute zero.
This is not to say that governments have no exposure to civil
liability whatsoever; rather, it is less than that of a company or
individual. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, munici-
palities have reduced exposure because “municipal legislative
functions are different in kind and are not amenable to judicial
constraint by the imposition of a private law duty of care” [24].
Governments' main exposure to civil liability lies in operational
negligence as opposed to policy decisions to which no liability
attaches. Henstra and McBean [18] and Roman [37] argue that the
difference between the two is a legal rationalization. As McLachlin
C.J. states in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited (2011) [35]:
“Core policy” government decisions protected from suit are
decisions as to a course or principle of action that are based on
public policy considerations, such as economic, social and po-
litical factors, provided they are neither irrational nor taken in
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Canadian cases on the issue, although it emphasizes positive
features of policy decisions, instead of relying exclusively on
the quality of being “non-operational”. (para. 90).
In the emergency management context, the choice to imple-
ment infrastructure in one area versus another or of one kind is a
policy decision due to the economic, social and political factors
involved in the decision-making process. By choosing to protect
one area in the event of a large-scale emergency, such as a ﬂood, to
the detriment of another, the government likely cannot be found
liable in negligence because of the character of the decision made.
The issue whether a particular course of action is operational or
policy is not always cut and dried. The degree of policy needed in
decision-making to determine whether or not such actions con-
stitute a policy decision versus an operational one remains a case
speciﬁc determination. As McLachlin C.J. further states,
Difﬁcult cases may be expected to arise from time to time where
it is not easy to decide whether the degree of “policy” involved
sufﬁces for protection from negligence liability. […] A black and
white test that will provide a ready and irrefutable answer for
every decision in the inﬁnite variety of decisions that govern-
ment actors may produce is likely chimerical. (para. 90).
For the affected land owner, even recourse to the courts for a
private law remedy is no sure thing. The law of negligence favors
government actors.
Even where a plan is available to deal with an emergent si-
tuation, the failure to act has been held to be a policy decision. In
Eliopoulis v. Ontario [8], George Eliopoulis contracted West Nile
Virus in 2002. He was treated in a hospital but later died in 2003.
His estate and family argued that Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of Ontario, who had jurisdiction over Ontario hospitals, owed a
private law duty of care that they failed to meet by having an
emergency plan to prevent the outbreak in 2002 and choosing not
to act. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the choice not to act
was a policy decision and, therefore, the government was not li-
able for any damages that resulted from that decision. For gov-
ernment to be exposed to civil liability in negligence a private duty
of care must exist which is negated if the decision(s) made is
determined to be a policy decision.
Despite these principles, it is important to note that govern-
ment is not exempt from all liability. In R. v. Imperial Tobacco
Canada [35], McLachlin C.J. wrote:
There is a wide consensus that the law of negligence must
account for the unique role of government agencies: Just v.
British Columbia [23]. On the one hand, it is important for
public authorities to be liable in general for their negligent
conduct in light of the pervasive role that they play in all as-
pects of society. Exempting all government actions from liabi-
lity would result in intolerable outcomes. On the other hand,
“the Crown is not a person and must be free to govern and
make true policy decisions without becoming subject to tort
liability as a result of those decisions.” ([23], 1239).
Canadian courts have found liability in negligence by govern-
ments where the conduct complained of clearly fell along the
operational end of the spectrum. In those cases, the claimant must
establish that a private law duty of care exists as established
through a statutory scheme or interactions between the local au-
thority and the plaintiff without interference from a statute
[35,38]. In Just v. British Columbia [23] and Swinamer v. Nova
Scotia [38], the Provinces' failure to properly maintain roads did
not give rise to the policy decision protection.
In an emergency management system designed to be reactive,
without explicit standards and, in many cases, without insuranceproducts to protect person(s) or their property from damages,
reduced government exposure to civil liability at common law
further challenges the safety and security of the public. It puts the
public at the mercy of government to subsidize losses that result
from a disaster/emergency, which is itself a recipe for disaster
especially when government compensation schemes are in-
adequate to the task.5. Discussion
Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and others have suggested that under various Re-
presentative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios of green-
house gas emissions, future climate conditions are expected to
cause more frequent and intense weather related events [20,21].
As the IPCC reports, it “is very likely that heat waves will occur
more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events
will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The
ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level
to rise {2.2}” which will lead to more frequent and intense natural
disasters [22].
In Canada, recent ﬂoods in the Calgary area (2015), lower
Manitoba (2014), and Toronto and Alberta (2013) highlight some
of the conditions that Canada's population and property have been
subject to. In British Columbia, the Institute of Catastrophic Loss
Reduction [19] has noted an increase in precipitation since the
1950s, despite recent drought-like conditions in the lower main-
land. As the ICLR [19] explain,
Since 1950 there has been a 20–30% increase in rainfall in
coastal British Columbia, a 5-10% increase in the northern in-
terior, and an annual change in rainfall of 0% to þ25% in the
southern interior. The large variation in these projections is due
in part to the potential for large spatial variation that can occur
in mountainous regions and interior plateaus. (50–51).
In fact, according to some researchers, community vulner-
ability, particularly coastal communities, to emergency events
caused by climate change is increasing [20,21,32,33]. As Nicholls
et al. [33] noted, Vancouver is one of the top 50 cities in the world
vulnerable to sea-level rise. Current climate change models predict
that exposure to ﬂooding is expected to increase throughout parts
of Canada [21]. As the ICLR [19] further states,
A 5–10% increase in precipitation is expected over the period
through 2050, with the largest increase occurring in coastal
areas and the northern interior. Increased precipitation is ex-
pected across [British Columbia] in the winter, but rainfall
should decrease in the summer, particularly in the southern
interior. There is high conﬁdence that there will be a 10–15%
increase in intense rainfall events. (50–51).
Accordingly, under RCP scenario 8.5, sea-levels are expected to
rise approximately 0.97 m by 2100 with glacial melting and ther-
mal expansion being the dominant contributors to this rise [21].
This exposes many coastal communities to impending threats,
some of which do not have measures in place to properly protect
citizens and their property from these future conditions.
The lack of legislated standards for proactive/precautionary
emergency management policy exposes the public to a host of
emergencies that could be mitigated in whole or in part. As it
stands in Canada, municipalities are principally responsible for
emergency management within their communities. With predic-
tions of more frequent and intense severe weather events in the
future, a community's ability to withstand the impacts and recover
from impacts from an event will be signiﬁcantly challenged. The
J. Raikes, G. McBean / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 16 (2016) 12–18 17burden of these events will fall squarely on the shoulders of in-
dividuals given the unavailability of insurance and inadequacies in
government disaster assistance programs. The limits on govern-
ment liability for damages for its conduct or lack of action puts
private land owners at risk not only for the underlying event but
also the actions taken by the municipality or Province as the case
may be.
Like individual land owners, communities have a ﬁnancial in-
terest in preventative, pro-active emergency management. It re-
duces the risk to their own assets and, as seen above, it may im-
prove access to aid from higher levels of government in the event
of a disaster. It also fulﬁlls their broader public responsibilities to
their constituents. Unfortunately, there are many demands made
on government and other priorities often supersede taking mea-
sures for a “what if” event. Leaving local governments to de-
termine what planning they should do, how to implement it (or
not) and what risks to address is fundamentally unfair to those
who will bear the more substantial ﬁnancial burdens of those
choices, i.e. private land owners. Current legislation (Quebec ex-
cepted) fails to recognize and address this concern. A statutory
regime which imposes detailed and more rigorous assessment,
planning and emergency response protocols and practices will
beneﬁt not only communities but those most at ﬁnancial risk. How
prescriptive these standards should be, who should be responsible
for funding more rigorously imposed emergency management,
should emergency management to natural disasters be solely a
government responsibility or should aspects of it be open to pri-
vatization, and what should the consequences be for authorities
that do not comply with imposed standards, are questions that
need to be addressed. Answering some of these questions is be-
yond the scope of this paper, but provide opportunities for further
research.
The issue of the importance of recognizing risks and taking
actions was highlighted in The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030 which was adopted at the Third UN World
Conference in Sendai, Japan, on March 18, 2015. One of the Prio-
rities for action is: Strengthening disaster risk governance to
manage disaster risk [43]. In consideration of ﬁnancial risks, it is
noted that “The transitional pathway from risk-blind to risk-sen-
sitive investment practices must be carefully managed as to avoid
penalizing companies, cities and countries that adopt a long-term,
risk-informed perspective using innovative approaches” ([41], 1).
Clear communication from government and businesses to the
public as to what constitutes a 1:100 year or 1:200 year event
could stimulate conversation on accessing a market in Canada that
has largely been avoided due to the ﬁnancial risks associated with
emergencies; however, caution should be taken in privatizing as-
pects of emergency management. As Gilmour and Jensen [17]
explain, privatizing aspects of emergency management that have
shown to be related to inefﬁcient government administration en-
ables government to avoid legal responsibility and lead to a
“wholesale loss of government accountability” (247). Research
addressing questions posed in the previous paragraph are neces-
sary in transitioning reactive management to proactive manage-
ment through disaster risk reduction strategies while limiting the
government's ability to divert accountability and protecting those
most at ﬁnancial risk.6. Conclusion
Recognizing, planning for and implementing a coordinated
approach to potential emergencies is best done by those with re-
sponsibility for the community's well-being. Individuals are un-
likely to have the resources necessary for such actions. It is es-
sential that those responsible for proactive/preventative planningfor disasters work from a standard playbook, one which sets
minimum safeguards for the public. This requires mandatory le-
gislated standards to ensure these preventative activities occur to
an acceptable level. In most of Canada, the current legislative re-
gimes contain permissive provisions with little or no guidance or
accountability. The result is a substantially increased risk to private
land owners which will only increase as climate change occurs.Acknowledgments
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